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Approved For Release 2000/09/02 : CIA-RDP83B00823R000100100007-9

9 November 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Deputy Director for  
Intelligence

SUBJECT : Intelligence Leaks

1. I have studied [REDACTED] memorandum on reporting intelligence leaks--against the background of recent OSR work on this subject--and offer the following observations.

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2. If the information is to be put in a format which lends itself to machine manipulation I think all the likely originators of reports of intelligence leaks should report in a standardized format coordinated with the Office of Security. The particular type of retrieval system will have a big influence on the kind of format selected.

3. I attach a draft list of items to be included in this type of report. This is not intended to be an exhaustive list but it is based on the needs reflected in the kinds of questions the White House asked us to consider in our analysis earlier this year.

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4. Under paragraph 2f of [REDACTED] memorandum he asked for an entry concerning recommendations for further action. Normally the Office originating the report of an intelligence leak will not be in a position to make this kind of a recommendation and I think in most cases it would be inappropriate for them to do so.

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[REDACTED]  
Deputy Director  
Strategic Research

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Report of Leak of Intelligence Information

Source: Author and dateline  
Title of Article  
Name of journal or newspaper  
Date and page number

Subject: Specify weapons systems and country involved,  
or other type of subject such as: Intelligence  
organization or sources, budgets, personalities,  
activities, etc., using multiple codes as  
necessary. (For example; Soviet ICBM's, ABM's,  
CIA position varies from DIA)

Geographic Area where Leak Probably Occurred: (if  
ascertainable) (Washington, Tokyo, Europe, Israel, etc.)

Sources or Information Compromised:  
Photography, Comint, Agent source, intelligence  
techniques or operation, etc.

Author's characterization of source:  
(US Official, Pentagon sources, Intelligence experts,  
etc.)

Document where information probably originated: Title  
and date (NIE; CIA, State, Defense or other departmental  
document or cable; USIB Minutes: etc.)

Gravity of Leak:  
Will probably result in loss or degradation of source.  
Might result in loss or degradation of source.  
Informs others of major intelligence judgment..  
Other comments as appropriate.

Recommendation for further action: (This entry will be  
filled in by Office of Security after full consideration  
of the case)

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